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1 
Polish Constitutional History and Tradition 
MONARCHY – REPUBLIC – NOBLES’ DEMOCRACY – FIRST EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION – ‘SOLIDARITY’ MOVEMENT – INDEPENDENCE – FREEDOM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) is a Central European country encompassing 
a territory of 322,575 sq km, with a population of around 38 million.1 It has a more than 
thousand year tradition as an independent state, formed from a collection of Slavic tribes 
around the ninth century. For centuries, Poland was an independent monarchy, first hereditary, 
then elective. It then lost its independence between 1795 and 1918 and was reborn as a republic 
post-World War I. Due to its geographic position in the centre of Europe, between Germany 
and Russia, its territories experienced both world wars, suffering 6 million casualties in World 
War II alone. The country also endured enormous material damage and losses to its territory 
when its borders were moved westward after the war. This in turn caused a wave of resettlement 
of citizens and migration. After World War II, Poland came under the influence of the Soviet 
Union, becoming a Communist state. It took until 1980 for real resistance against the 
Communist government to emerge, most visibly in the form of the social movement 
‘Solidarity,’ led by Lech Wałęsa. Because of its repeated suffering over the centuries Poland 
has been, not without reason, labelled ‘God’s playground’.2 Nowadays, having regained its 
independence for the most recent time in 1989, Poland benefits from its central position in 
Europe in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, services and new technologies. Poland 
today is a member of NATO (since 1999) and the European Union (since 2004).  
This chapter highlights a number of key aspects characteristic of Polish constitutionalism: the 
thirst for independence; attachment to freedom, both as a nation and in its citizens; and peaceful 
conflict resolution. The chapter also traces the development of freedoms and rights, and the 
formation of independent constitutional review.   
Poland and its citizens are characterised by a strong desire for freedom and the perception of 
the state as Rzeczpospolita, referring not only to the Republic of Poland and thereby denoting 
the name of the state, but also its republican system and, at a more abstract level, its community 
of citizens. Poland’s tradition of freedom and independence goes back to the late Middle Ages 
and these traditions remain meaningful for today’s constitutionalism. In particular, Poland 
adopted a system called a ‘nobles’ democracy’ (from the fifteenth to eighteenth century) with 
a number of concepts that were original at the time, such as sovereignty of law and religious 
                                                 
1 Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warszawa 2017) 82 and 205. 
2 See N Davies, Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski (Kraków, Wydawnictwo Znak, 2010).  
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tolerance, but also some that led to the eventual failure of the state, for instance liberum veto, 
a form of unanimity voting that disabled the functioning of the parliament.  
Contemporary Polish constitutionalism is represented by the Constitution of 1997. It was 
adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997. The Constitution was then approved by 
the nation in the referendum of 25 May 1997. The Constitution was supported by 53,45 per 
cent of the eligible voters, with a turnout of 42,86 per cent.3 The Constitution entered into force 
on 17 October 1997.4 It is a comprehensive tract, consisting of 243 articles. The Constitution 
contains, inter alia, a catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms, provisions on the 
bicameral parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), the executive (the President and the 
government), the judiciary, local self-government, public finances and the procedure for 
constitutional amendment. The Constitution of 1997 has been a symbol of a free Poland, based 
on the values of human dignity and the rule of law and guaranteeing both the state’s 
independence and the freedom of its citizens.  
For over twenty years, under the 1997 Constitution various government majorities held power. 
In 2015, the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) won the parliamentary elections 
and began to make radical changes to the state system. These changes were effected in the form 
of statutes rather than formal constitutional amendments.5 The Law and Justice government, 
despite retaining relatively broad support from the electorate, does not have a sufficient 
majority in the parliament to amend the Constitution. The negative changes that have taken 
place in Poland since 2015 concern the judiciary to the largest extent, and as a consequence 
pose a threat to constitutional freedoms and rights.6 
II. INDEPENDENCE AND REPUBLICANISM 
A. Independence 
Poland’s statehood, in the form of an independent kingdom, took shape over the tenth and 
eleventh century. In 966, Mieszko I, the leader of the Polans (Polanie) tribe that inhabited the 
territories of what would eventually become Poland, converted to Christianity and was 
baptised, an event that has been called the ‘Baptism of Poland’. The baptism greatly 
strengthened the country, and Christianity quickly became the state religion. In 1025, the first 
king, Bolesław Chrobry, was crowned, which further stabilised the state and its authority. In 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the Polish court was one of the strongest in Europe, 
reflecting the political and economic status of the country at the time. In 1569, Poland joined 
into union with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, creating the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
(Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów). The Commonwealth spread over a vast territory of 1 000 
                                                 
3 Announcement of the National Electoral Committee of 26 May 1997 on the outcome of vote and outcome of 
the constitutional referendum of 25 May 1997, JL 1997 No 54 Pos 353. 
4 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 
April 1997), JL 1997 No 78 Pos 483, JL 2001 No 28 Pos 319, JL 2006 No 200 Pos 1471, JL 2009 No 114 Pos 
946. This book relies on the English translation of the Constitution available on the website of the Polish 
parliament: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. 
5 Art 235 of the Constitution. 
6 See chs 5, 6 and 8. 
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000 sq. km, governed by a monarch that was both the king of Poland and the Grand Duke of 
Lithuania. Until its fall in 1795, the Commonwealth remained a dualist state consisting of the 
Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This was the only period during which 
Poland was a federation. 
In the eighteenth century, due to frequent wars, the reign of nobles who were landowners of 
vast terrains, and a lack of reforms of state institutions, the country’s importance diminished. 
It gradually lost its territories as a result of wars or on the basis of threats from foreign courts. 
Poland, in the form of an independent kingdom, existed until the end of the eighteenth century. 
In 1795, Poland lost its independence and its territory was partitioned between the Russian 
Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and Habsburg Austria. One of the reasons for the fall of the 
state was the anarchy caused by the nobility who perceived themselves as being beyond the 
law, which undermined the state institutions, for example making it impossible to conduct a 
necessary military reform that would have strengthened the country. Attempts at reforms that 
followed the ideas of Enlightenment were not sufficient to save Poland, which in consequence 
disappeared from the maps.7 
Poland regained its independence in 1918 thanks to the favourable political situation following 
the defeat of Austria and Germany in World War I and the revolution in Russia. For over 120 
years the Catholic church, the faith, and education played an important role in maintaining the 
spirit of independence. Great uprisings – in November of 1830 and January of 1863 – were 
bloodily suppressed by the invaders. The Little Treaty of Versailles specifically concerning 
Poland (1919), signed the same day as the main Treaty of Versailles, ‘restored to the Polish 
nation the independence of which it had been unjustly deprived.’8 
Poland resurfaced as a republic instead of a monarchy, a unitary instead of a federal state. The 
Constitution of 1921 (‘the March Constitution’) proclaimed that ‘the Polish state is 
Rzeczpospolita’.9 Rzeczpospolita10 (Republic of Poland) was the formal name of the country, 
relating to the tradition that existed before 1795, and thereby underlining the continuity of 
Polish statehood. The notion of Rzeczpospolita, in Latin res publica (common good; common 
wealth), is still used in Poland as a synonym for a republican system and in the official name 
of the country. 
Poland in 1918 was not a newly established state, but rather one that was reborn after a period 
of suppression and partition. It was the same nation that existed at the end of the eighteenth 
century. This idea was incontestable in terms of public perception. The March Constitution in 
its preamble confirmed the continuity of the nation and state, referring to, amongst other things, 
the historic Constitution of 3 May 1791 discussed below. The period between 1918 and 1939 
was prosperous: it was possible to merge the territories that were previously under partition, to 
operate public institutions and to rebuild the economy. 
                                                 
7 See J Bardach, B Leśnodorski, M Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i praw polskiego (Warszawa, Lexis Nexis, 2016). 
8 Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, signed at Versailles (28 
June 1919). 
9 Constitution of 17 March 1921, JL 1921 No 44 Pos 267. 
10 Pronounced as [ʐɛt͡ ʂpɔsˈpɔlʲita]. 
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In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, breaching all of their international obligations, 
invaded Poland. The invaders divided Polish territories among themselves according to the 
border delineated in the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939. The occupiers 
introduced a system of terror, extermination, and deportation of the citizens. The Nazis funded 
and operated concentration and extermination camps. The largest of the Nazi camps was 
Auschwitz-Birkenau where 1.1 million people were killed.11 The Soviet Union was responsible 
for a series of crimes, amongst them the infamous Katyń massacre (1940), a mass execution of 
Polish army officers, and mass deportation of Poles to Siberia. World War II was the cruellest 
experience for the nation and the state. 
The peace treaties of Yalta and Potsdam (1945) that ended World War II pushed Poland into 
the Russian sphere of influence. Between 1945 and 1989, Poland functioned as a totalitarian 
Communist state. The Communists were violently suppressing demonstrations – such as ‘the 
Poznań 1956 protests’ or ‘December 1970 protests’ – directed against their government. The 
apogee of the Communist oppression was the introduction of the martial law in 1981. The 
Soviet system of government implied that all power was in the hands of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Parta Robotnicza, PZPR). That party dependent upon 
and supported by the Soviet State security apparatus and its military. This situation created a 
‘protective umbrella’ over the state authority at the time, which eliminated its enemies and 
paralysed any social resistance. However, the Catholic Church offered some resistance and 
fostered development of social opposition by appealing to the Communist powers for respect 
towards fundamental human rights and supporting democratic opposition in various forms. At 
that time, the Catholic Church provided, among others, an open meeting and discussion space 
for the opposition.12 The eventual fall of the Communist system took place in a peaceful 
manner, manifested in the idea of the ‘Round Table’ talks (February-April 1989), with 
discussions between the Communist government and the opposition, and was finalised in the 
Round Table Agreement of 5 April 1989. 
Taking its history into consideration, it is understandable that the Polish Constitution of 1997 
underlines the importance of an independent country and the security thereof. The Preamble 
expresses gratitude to Polish ancestors for ‘their struggle for independence achieved at great 
sacrifice’ and ‘our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human 
values.’ The Constitution recalls that in 1989 the nation ‘recovered the possibility of a 
democratic determination of its fate’ after the Communist dictatorship of 1944-1989. 
According to the Constitution, the first task of the Republic of Poland is to safeguard the 
independence and integrity of its territory.13 The Constitution assigns the fulfilment of this task 
to the Armed Forces, which also ensure the security and inviolability of state borders.14 At the 
same time, the Armed Forces remain politically neutral and subject to civil control. The 
Constitution also involves other state organs in this function. The President is designated as the 
guardian of sovereignty and security of the state as well as of the inviolability and integrity of 
                                                 
11 See at http://www.auschwitz.org. 
12 W Roszkowski, Historia Polski 1914-2015 (Warszawa, PWN, 2017) 380-408. 
13 Art 5 of the Constitution. 
14 Art 26 of the Constitution. 
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its territory.15 The government ensures the external security of the state.16 Those provisions 
prove how important the nation’s independence was for the drafters of the Constitution. 
B. Rzeczpospolita 
As discussed above, the notion of Rzeczpospolita has a rich and specific content. It functions 
as the name of the Polish state (Rzeczpospolita Polska) and features in the full name of the 
Constitution. In this sense, it can be translated into ‘the Republic of Poland’. However, limiting 
this notion to this translation would be insufficient. Rzeczpospolita functions in a number of 
other contexts and each of them is meaningful. 
First, Rzeczpospolita is the name of the Polish state, differentiating it from other countries. The 
Constitution’s preamble distinguishes between the first, second and third Republics of Poland. 
The First Republic concerns the early period of the state’s existence until 1795, while the 
Second Republic denotes the interwar period of 1918-1945. The Third Republic of Poland is 
the form of state adopted in the Constitution of 1997. It is the continuation of the ‘best traditions 
of the First and Second Republics’. However, in the common perception the notion of the Third 
Republic of Poland is much broader than that implied by the Constitution. It is understood as 
the form of the state that had its beginnings in 1989.  
The second meaning of the term Rzeczpospolita is even more peculiar. It denotes a community 
of citizens that functions within the state framework that is a common good. According to 
Article 1 of the Constitution, the Republic of Poland is ‘a common good of all its citizens’. 
This understanding of the term derives from the country’s history: in the past, Poland existed 
as a monarchy and the closest translation of this concept is the English commonwealth; state as 
a community or community for a common good.   
In its third meaning Rzeczpospolita is a synonym of the republican form of government. Within 
this meaning, Rzeczpospolita is understood as a republic, a political term that is common in 
many states. Rzeczpospolita as a government or republican authority is a constitutional 
principle. Its positive meaning describes a form of exercise of power that is in the hands of the 
majority of the citizens (res publica as a people’s good or public affair), while its negative 
meaning excludes hereditary or lifetime power. In contemporary states, the republic takes the 
form of a state ruled by law, while in the Constitution of 1997 in addition to the rule of law,17 
the republic is also the common good of all its citizens.18 
III. DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 
A. Nobles’ Democracy 
Nobles’ democracy was a system of government that functioned in Poland from sixteenth 
century until 1795.19 The formal beginning of nobles’ democracy is traced back to 1505 when 
                                                 
15 Art 126 of the Constitution. 
16 Art 146(4) point 8 of the Constitution. 
17 Art 2 of the Constitution. 
18 See further in Ch 2. 
19 See J Tazbir, Kultura szlachecka w Polsce (Warszawa, Wiedza Powszechna, 1979) 
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the parliament adopted the Nihil Novi resolution. This act prevented the king from issuing laws 
without the agreement of the parliament. In addition, the king could not amend the rights and 
privileges of this class. The main aspects of nobles’ democracy that were decisive for the 
position of nobility and in consequence for the functioning of the state, concerned the decision-
making process in parliament under liberum veto (the free veto) and the election system of the 
king. The question of liberum veto and the free election also were among the causes of the fall 
of the First Republic at the end of the eighteenth century. In Polish constitutionalism those 
institutions are therefore often used to make the point that unlimited nobles’ democracy led to 
dysfunctionality of the state.  
The parliament (Sejm) has existed since the end of the fifteenth century. It consisted of three 
‘deliberating estates’: the king, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate. The main function of 
the parliament was to decide on state laws. The Chamber of Deputies consisted of the 
representatives of the nobility elected in the provincial parliaments (sejmiki ziemskie) and 
bound by the instructions from these bodies.20 After the end of the session of the parliament, 
the representatives would report to their provincial parliaments on the issues discussed and 
decided in the parliament. This represented a means for the nobility to gain influence on state 
affairs. The Senate consisted of the members of the former Royal Council, including the Roman 
Catholic archbishops and bishops and the highest state officials. The king as the third 
‘deliberating estate’ called the sessions of the parliament. In principle, the parliament met every 
two years for a six-week ordinary session, or for a shorter, extraordinary session. The 
parliament adopted laws - at the time called constitutions - which concerned the income and 
expenses of the state, its taxes and the military. 
The crucial issue for the functioning of the nobles’ democracy was that the parliament would 
take decisions via unanimity. Forcing any decision by the majority against the minority was 
seen as violating the principle of equality of rights of provincial parliaments. In consequence, 
by invoking the liberum veto, any member could force an immediate end to the session of the 
parliament and nullify any piece of legislation approved at the session. In practice, the liberum 
veto meant more than just an objection against an unwanted bill. It was a principle of the state 
system that protected the nobility from absolute monarchy. It also expressed the core of the 
freedoms of the nobility: the members of parliament were not obliged to justify the liberum 
veto. In consequence, the liberum veto paralysed the decision-making process. None of the 
attempts to limit the liberum veto and introduce majoritarian decision-making succeeded.  
In the noble’s democracy the king was chosen in the so-called free election, again granting 
influence to the noble class alone. The noblemen voted for a candidate from among themselves, 
so that, in practice, anyone from within the class could become king. During the election 
process, the noblemen would agree with the candidate, in writing, a set of conditions that the 
future king had to fulfil (pacta conventa). These reflected the political and economic program 
that the king undertook to implement.21  
                                                 
20 See M Borucki, Sejmy i sejmiki szlacheckie (Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1972). 
21 See Bardach, Leśnodorski, Pietrzak (n 7).   
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B. Constitution of 3 May 1791 
The system of nobles’ democracy was unsustainable and threatened the independence of the 
state. In response, a group of patriots gathered around the last king of Poland, Stanisław August 
Poniatowski, and proposed a reform of the state in the form of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. 
This act introduced some of the modern principles of a political system of the Enlightenment 
period, such as the sovereignty of the nation and the separation of powers. In this respect it 
followed the French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen (1789) in that 
‘[t]he principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation’.22 The Constitution of 3 
May 1791, adopted four months earlier than the constitution of revolutionary France of 
September 1791, made Poland the first country in Europe to enact a formal constitution.  
What is the meaning of the Constitution of 3 May 1791 for Poland today? Why do the Poles 
refer to it whenever drafting a new constitution? The Constitution of 3 May 1791 – labelled the 
testament for future generations of Poles – replaced the elective, feudal monarchy with a 
constitutional one.23 Even during the period of the Enlightenment, it was seen as the ‘real 
artwork of the nation’.24 It expressed the idea that the fate of Poland and its citizens depended 
upon themselves. It was not imposed on the people in the way that happened later in 1807 by 
Napoleon I for the Duchy of Warsaw or in 1815 by Emperor Alexander I for the Kingdom of 
Poland. Moreover, the Constitution of 3 May 1791 signified the willingness of the Polish 
people to reform the political system and to save the country from collapsing. Although the 
Constitution of 3 May 1791 was in force for less than a year, it is seen in Poland as the 
foundation of its current constitutional system. May 3rd remains a national holiday to this day. 
Against this background, the discussion of selected principles of the state system under the 
Constitution of 3 May 1791 seems necessary.  
The Constitution of 3 May 1791 designed the legislative branch as a Chamber of Deputies 
(Sejm) and Senate. The crucial change was that the parliament approved laws by majority vote 
and no longer by unanimity. Majoritarian decision making allowed the parliament to fulfil the 
legislative function more effectively than on the basis of unanimity. The members of the 
Chamber of Deputies became free in their vote (free mandate) and representative of the entire 
nation instead of the noble class alone. The Senate presided over by the king lost its position at 
the expense of the Chamber of Deputies.25 The Senate could only either approve or suspend a 
bill, without the possibility of exercising a veto. 
Within the executive branch, the Constitution of 3 May 1791 abolished the election of the king 
by the nobles.26 Instead, the throne was to be passed on by the right of succession, thereby re-
establishing a hereditary monarchy. The king became the commander in chief of the army 
during wartime. The executive power was vested in the king and the ministers nominated by 
the king to the Royal Council (‘Guardians of the Laws’). Every resolution of the king needed 
                                                 
22 Art V of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. 
23 W Uruszczak, Konstytucja 3 Maja 1791 r. Testament polityczny I Rzeczypospolitej (2011) 103 Przegląd 
Sejmowy 9. 
24 Z Szcząska, ‘Ustawa Rządowa z 1791 r.’ in: M Kallas (ed.), Konstytucje Polski. Studia monograficzne z 
dziejów polskiego konstytucjonalizmu: praca zbiorowa (Warszawa, PWN, 1990) 76. 
25 Art VI of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. 
26 Art VII of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. 
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to be signed by one of the ministers of the Royal Council, which in practice took away much 
of the executive power from the king. The parliament could hold the ministers of the Royal 
Council politically accountable, as well as constitutionally accountable before the Chamber of 
Deputies’ court. Overall, these relatively modern approaches enabled the creation of an 
effective executive around the king, without granting the latter absolute power. 
The judicial power was anchored in the civil and criminal courts.27 The Constitution 
highlighted that neither the legislature nor the executive could exercise judicial power. Despite 
this formal introduction of the principle of the separation of powers, certain judicial activities 
were reserved to Chamber of Deputies’ committees as well as to the Chamber’s court dealing 
with constitutional accountability.  
It is worth highlighting that the neighbouring absolutist European powers of the time – the 
Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and Habsburg Austria – perceived the Constitution 
of 3 May 1791 as a product of the French Revolution and thus as a threat. The resulting military 
attack destroyed the Polish state. In 1795, Poland was divided up between the neighbouring 
powers in the third partition of Poland, and lost its independence for the next 123 years. 
C. Peaceful Conflict Resolution 
The Constitution of 3 May 1791 positioned itself against extreme solutions. Its drafters chose 
to take an inclusive path that would gain the widest support at the time. The Constitution aimed 
at political and social change through peaceful reforms rather than a revolution that would end 
in bloodshed. Later on, Poland again relied on the heritage of the Constitution of 3 May 1791 
in a crucial moment of its history: the fall of Communism and the adoption of a new 
constitution for the democratic state.  
After 1945, Poland did not become an independent country, but instead came under Soviet 
influence. The imposed Communist state was politically and economically dependent upon the 
Soviet Union. These conditions also found an expression in the constitutional law of the time. 
The Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic (which was the name of the state at the time) 
adopted in 1952 mirrored the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936.28 The main idea of the 
1952 Constitution, as well as the whole concept of constitutionalism of real socialism, was to 
express the notion of a ‘constitution of results’. The constitution was understood predominantly 
as a political act, aimed at registering achievements in the process of the building of socialism, 
rather than having any significance as a legal act.  
After 1956, the political environment became somewhat freer. Yet, when ‘Solidarity’, a widely 
supported trade union and social movement, was created in 1980, the Communists did not 
hesitate to introduce martial law in 1981 with the aim of suppressing the aspirations of freedom 
of the nation. During that period, the Communist government tightened the screw on society 
by conducting a curfew, ‘pacifications’ of workplaces, disappearances and politically 
motivated murders. Despite this, ‘Solidarity’ decided to force the overthrow of the system 
through an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, process. This led to talks between the 
                                                 
27 Art VIII of the Constitution of 3 May 1791. 
28 Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic adopted by the of 22 July 1952, JL 1952 No 33 Pos 232. 
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democratic opposition and the Communist government and the Round Table Agreement of 5 
April 1989. The Communist party, the power of which was diminishing, sought some form of 
co-governance, in order to share with the opposition the responsibility for the disastrous social 
and economic situation in Poland that was becoming evident. The first, partially free elections 
on 4 June 1989 played a key role in the peaceful removal of the Communist government. The 
elections for the reinstated Senate were fully free, while the Communist party was guaranteed 
65 per cent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The change in the system was not sudden; it 
did not immediately destroy the socialist order, but allowed for a gradual accession to power 
by the opposition.  
The changes that took place in Poland concerning the peaceful transition from the Communist 
system to a democratic regime can be seen as a ‘revolution without a revolution’. 29 Communist 
parties collapsed first in Poland in 1989 and subsequently in other Eastern European states 
during the so-called Autumn of Nations. Democratic and parliamentary institutions replaced 
legal concepts of Soviet origin. In Poland, this development manifested itself in the amendment 
of the old Constitution of 1952 on 29 December 1989, reinstating the traditional name of the 
state, the Republic of Poland, and the introduction of the principle of democratic state ruled by 
law. This principle, expressed in Article 1 of the amended Constitution of 1952 symbolically 
replaced the provision stating that Poland is a socialist state. 
The 1989 political transition necessitated the adoption of a new constitution. Work on this 
document began in 1989. It continued in 1989–1991, 1992–1993, and then again during 1993–
1997. Between 1992 and 1997 the so-called Small Constitution was in force.30 From the outset 
it had a temporary character. The ongoing work on a ‘big’ constitution was lagging because of, 
among others, the lack of clarity about the procedure for the drafting and adoption of the 
constitution. In the end, the Chamber of Deputies adopted the Act of 23 April 1992 establishing 
a procedural framework for the drafting and adoption of the new constitution by the National 
Assembly and its approval by the nation in a referendum.31 As a reflection of the period and 
the conditions of its drafting, the adopted Constitution of 1997 has an extremely consensual 
character. 
IV. FREEDOM IN POLISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The political effort to safeguard Poland’s freedom – understood as independence from outside 
interference – represented a long struggle for the Polish nation throughout its history. Initial 
attempts to prevent the government from overstepping the rule of law took many years to 
manifest themselves in the constitution. Progress in the struggle for freedom was intertwined 
with periods of failure. The above-mentioned insurrections of 1831 and 1863 were examples 
                                                 
29 See A Dudek, Reglamentowana Rewolucja: rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988-1990 (Kraków, 
Wydawnictwo Znak Horyzont, 2014). 
30 Constitutional Statute of 17 October 1992 on mutual relations between the legislative and executive power in 
the Republic of Poland and on the local self-government (‘Small Constitution’), JL 1992 No 84 Pos 426, JL 
1995 No 38 Pos 184 and 150, Pos 729, JL 1996 No 106 Pos 488. 
31 Constitutional Statute of 23 April 1992 on the preparation and adoption of the Constitution of Poland, JL 1992 
No 67 Pos 336.  
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of this struggle. Despite early success, both uprisings failed, in consequence worsening the 
situation of the people. Later, during World War II, a major operation of the Polish resistance, 
the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, presented an attempt, ultimately a failed one, to liberate Poland’s 
capital from Nazi Germany. Even earlier, the 1943 uprising in the Warsaw ghetto was an armed 
resistance of Jewish underground organisations, opposing the liquidation of the ghetto by Nazi 
Germany.32  In the period after 1945, despite the strength of Communist power, there were 
open forms of civic resistance, such as manifestations and violent street fights, for example in 
Poznań (1956) and Gdańsk (1970). Despite the casualties incurred, seen in retrospect, these 
events aided the movement for freedom. Specifically, the workers’ manifestations of 1970, 
enabled the creation of free trade unions, and in 1980 after another wave of strikes, the 
‘Solidarity’ movement was born. Between August 1980 and December 1981, ‘Solidarity’ 
developed from a trade union into a massive social independence movement, demanding 
respect for human dignity, free speech, and the social rights for workers. It grew into a 
movement of 10 million people in 1981 and became one of the pillars of Poland’s 
independence. 
The freedom regained presents a characteristic element of Polish constitutionalism in the sense 
that it finds explicit reflection in the constitutional text. When Poland became an independent 
state in 1918, the euphoria of freedom was transferred into the March Constitution, which 
described the state as an organisation protecting the individual interests of its citizens as well 
as the freedom of the whole state. The March Constitution granted the individual a wide 
freedom for political, economic, social and cultural activity, reflected in a catalogue of rights 
and freedoms, protected by the principle of non-discrimination. In addition, the March 
Constitution introduced voting rights for women. That constitution already contained almost 
all of the elements, known at the time, that were necessary for the functioning of the state and 
for maintaining the freedoms of its citizens. The only missing element known to and supported 
by legal scholars at that time was constitutional review.33 Another issue was the lack of 
legislators’ capability to combine ‘the traditional, Polish attention to freedom’ with the need 
for a strong government to keep the Polish territories unified after years of partition.34 In 1926, 
the executive power was strengthened in the so-called August reform of the March Constitution 
by increasing the powers of the executive at the expense of the legislature.  
Today’s 1997 Constitution also expresses the elements of freedom. First, its origin is rooted in 
a deep political and social consensus. The drafters aimed at implementing the demands of 
different political powers. Sometimes the fact that the Constitution reflects different 
compromises is seen as a weakness or a drawback. Specifically, it is, wrongly, argued that the 
Constitution has a number of loopholes or that the Round Table was to some extent the ‘patron’ 
of the Constitution. Second, the Constitution of 1997 treats freedom as the natural state of the 
citizens. The Constitution does not define freedom; instead its text implies that freedom enjoys 
                                                 
32 N Davies, Boże Igrzysko (Kraków, Znak, 2010) 927. 
33 See M Granat, ‘Problem kontroli konstytucyjności prawa Polsce międzywojennej’, in P Sarnecki (ed), Prawo 
konstytucyjne II Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Nauka i konstytucja (Kraków, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, 2006) 101. See Section VI in this chapter. 
34 See W Komarnicki, Ustrój państwowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warszawa, nakł. Księg. F. Hoesicka, 1934) 
24.  
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primacy vis-à-vis the law and the law only endorses it. The law protects rather than guarantees 
freedoms that are already in the individual’s possession. Freedom stands before the law and 
before the Constitution. The protection of human dignity contained in the Constitution of 1997 
further strengthens this understanding of freedom. Both of these principles are discussed in 
Chapter 8, but it can already be highlighted at this point that the Constitution’s approach to 
freedom has a positive influence on human rights and the social system of the state. Third, the 
Constitution created strong fundaments for the judicial power, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
However, the separation and independence of the judiciary have been threatened as shown by 
the constitutional crisis that began in 2015.35 
V. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND 
The Communist Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic – discussed earlier – degraded 
human rights. Most of all, in what was a one-party state, while in power the ruling Communist 
Party often violated human rights in a brutal fashion. The Constitution and legal doctrine of the 
time did not employ the notion of ‘human rights’ or ‘freedoms and rights of the person.’ 
Instead, the term ‘citizens’ rights’ was applied, implying that the rights were collective rights 
which stemmed from the government in power at the time rather than being based on the 
protection of individual human rights set out in the constitution. Specifically, it was 
characteristic for a Soviet type constitution to declare citizens’ rights such as the right to work 
– implying that employment for everyone would be ensured – but not to grant that right the 
character of a subjective right.36 Moreover, those types of constitutions encompassed elaborate 
programs and previews of citizens’ rights.37 Yet, in fact these were only political declarations. 
They did not have any legal meaning as justiciable constitutional provisions. For example, on 
the one hand the 1952 Constitution declared that the state authorities cared about and supported 
the development of art and literature.38 On the other hand, censorship was strongly present in 
the Polish People’s Republic, and many artists were forced to emigrate. As a consequence, the 
process of developing human rights in Poland post-1989 had to begin with the rejection of the 
Communist doctrine.  
Thus, it is quite unsurprising that resistance against the Communist authorities in Poland 
developed against the background of a general proposal that people be treated subjectively as 
individuals. This idea was expressed in the establishment of the first organisations committed 
to the fight for human rights, including labour rights. In particular, this trend was evident with 
the emergence of illegal organisations such as the Movement for the Defence of Human and 
Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO), and the Worker’s 
Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) which were fought by the 
government. 39 Of particular significance was the establishment of Solidarity which put forward 
                                                 
35 See further in ch 5 and 6. 
36 Art 58(1) of the Constitution of 1952. 
37 See eg Art 62 and 63 of the Constitution of 1952. 
38 Art 64 of the Constitution of 1952. 
39 See A Paczkowski, Pól wieku dziejów Polski 1939 -1989 (Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005); 
G Waligóra, ROPCiO. Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela 1977- 1981 (Warszawa, Instytut Pamięci 
Narodowej, 2006). 
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economic and human rights proposals. Moreover, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975) offered an important contribution, especially its 
third ‘basket of rights’, which focused on human rights. Similarly crucial was the 1977 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The fight for human rights was one of the 
main aspects of the opposition movement that led to the fall of the Communist system at the 
end of the 1980s. During that time, similar changes took place in other post-Communist 
states.40  
In the 1990s, the recognition of human rights began to flourish in Poland. The case law of the 
Constitutional Court played an important role in this regard. The Constitutional Court began to 
invoke the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ratified by Poland in 1993, in its 
judgments. Before 1997, some of the key legal principles crucial in human rights adjudication, 
for instance the proportionality principle, were yet unknown in Poland and rights, like the right 
to privacy had their source in the ECHR.41 Moreover, at that time, the legal scholarship dealing 
with human rights was very active.42 The impact of the ECHR and other international human 
rights instruments was crucial for the shaping of the concept of human rights in free Poland. 
The Constitution of 1997 ‘consumed’ those concepts to a large extent, with a major emphasis 
on the avenues for claiming individual rights.  
The decisive step towards better protection of human rights was the regulation of freedoms and 
rights in the new Constitution of 1997. The Constitution delivered a completely new set of 
general principles of human rights (human dignity, freedom of the person, and equality), and 
provided a catalogue of rights, following in this regard a scheme typical of UN human rights 
acts. The broad catalogue therein incorporates three clusters: (1) personal; (2) political; and (3) 
economic, social and cultural freedoms and rights. In addition, the catalogue of rights was 
supported by specific institutions dedicated to safeguarding human rights: the right of access 
to the court; the right to appeal a judgment; and the right to constitutional complaint. A crucial 
achievement was the establishment of the Ombudsman as early as 1987, at the end of the 
Communist period.43 This office was then introduced in the Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic in 1989. 
The new approach to freedoms and rights embodied in the Constitution of 1997 and the contrast 
to the pre-1989 citizens’ rights model is evident in many areas. The Constitution uses the notion 
of ‘freedoms and rights’ in that particular order. The sequence of those words is not accidental. 
First, it presents a reaction to the application of the notion of citizens’ rights present in the 
Soviet-type constitutions, which de-emphasised the freedoms of those citizens. Second, that 
                                                 
40 M Granat, Likwidacja monopolistycznej pozycji partii komunistycznych (Lublin, Centrum Samorządu i 
Administracji, 1992) 41. 
41 Constitutional Court, judgment of 24.06.1997, K 21/96, OTK ZU 2/1997, poz. 23. On the early case law 
concerning the application of the right to privacy see M Safjan, ‘Prawo do ochrony życia prywatnego’ in L 
Wiśniewski (ed) Podstawowe prawa jednostki i ich sądowa ochrona (Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997). 
42 B Banszak, Prawa jednostki i systemy ich ochrony (Wrocław 1995); P Hofmański, Ochrona praw człowieka 
(Białystok, Temida 2, 1994); M Piechowiak, ‘Pojęcie praw człowieka’ in L Wiśniewski (ed) Podstawowe prawa 
jednostki i ich sądowa ochrona (Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997). 
43 Law of 15 July 1987 on the Ombudsman, JL 2018 Pos 2179. See Ch 8. 
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particular sequence – freedoms before rights – highlights that the human condition is more 
fundamental than that of the citizen, thereby also stressing the natural character of human 
rights. In addition, the Constitution set aside the notion that any exercise of rights is conditional 
upon fulfilling obligations towards the state, which was characteristic of the approach under 
Communism.  
VI. DEVELOPMENT – AND CRISIS – OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW  
One of the most fascinating events in Polish constitutional law has been the establishment of 
constitutional review; this process started even before the fall of Communism. The 
Constitutional Court was established in 1985. The ‘Polish way’ toward constitutional review 
took a trial and error approach to the adoption of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review. 
In this aspect it differed from other central and eastern European states, which introduced 
constitutional review later and based on ready-made concepts from Austria and Germany. In 
addition, already in the inter-war period (1918-1939), both the March Constitution of 1921 and 
the April Constitution of 1935 prescribed that no statute could be contrary to the Constitution. 
However, neither a constitutional court nor a specific procedure for review of unconstitutional 
statutes was foreseen, although the scholarship of various legal traditions and political 
backgrounds underlined the value of a constitutional court.44 
During the Polish People’s Republic (1944-89) constitutional review was obviously not 
foreseen as part of the undemocratic Communist state. Formally, the Constitutional Court was 
introduced in 1982 by an amendment to the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic. 
Subsequently, in 1985, the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal offered a basis for the Court’s 
functioning, and it began operating in January 1986 and pronounced its first judgment within 
the few first months. The creation of the Constitutional Court was a controlled concession of 
the Communist party, which transpired to have far-reaching consequences. The Communist 
authority formally accepted that laws had to comply with the Constitution. There was a 
safeguard, however, as judgements of the Constitutional Court declaring laws as 
unconstitutional were not final. Until 1997, the Chamber of Deputies, as the highest organ of 
state power, could, by a two-thirds majority, vote to reject such judgments of the Constitutional 
Court. As such, the establishment of the Constitutional Court was an achievement of the period 
of political liberalisation in late 1980s. Nonetheless, it remained a defective institution: a 
Kelsenian idea built in an undemocratic system of government. Despite this major flaw, the 
Constitutional Court even before 1989 represented the core idea of constitutionalism: the 
primacy of the Constitution and importance of human rights protection.  
The Constitution of 1997 finally introduced a fully independent Constitutional Court and a 
centralised model of constitutional review. The Constitution includes the Constitutional Court 
among the organs of the judicial power.45 Its name (Trybunał), its members – described as 
judges, their independence, and the judgments, which follow hearings, are all typical of an 
organ of the judiciary. Calling the Constitutional Court a ‘court’ is therefore uncontroversial. 
                                                 
44 See especially the writings of Władysław L Jaworski, Stefan Starzyński, and Wacław Komarnicki. 
45 Art 10(2) of the Constitution. 
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The Constitutional Court often labels itself as a ‘court of law’ (sąd nad prawem). In this sense, 
the Constitutional Court does not deal with the facts of the case, with the sole exception of 
controlling the compliance of political parties’ activities with the Constitution. 
The Constitution of 1997 rendered the judgments of the Constitutional Court final and 
universally binding. Thanks to the new competences enshrined in the Constitution of 1997 and 
through the development of its own case law, the Constitutional Court achieved an important 
position in the constitutional system of Poland. It was the sole and unquestioned instance of 
constitutional review. Its role and judgments were not called into question or rejected. The 
Constitutional Court exercising constitutional review, decided on key issues for the young 
state’s institutional system such as Poland’s membership in the EU, as well as issues 
concerning day-to-day aspects of life, such as the retirement and pension system, or the 
character of penalties for illegal tree cutting.46 The existence of the Constitutional Court itself 
was a safeguard against enactments of unconstitutional laws. As such, the value of 
constitutional review might obscure its possible disadvantages, failures in its functioning, or 
other allegations, such as judicial activism. Over the years, the Constitutional Court maintained 
the rigour of rationality in its jurisprudence, something that is evident from its meticulously 
justified judgments and public hearings of cases. Although the Court attempted to maintain 
judicial self-restraint, this did not shield it from political attacks.  
In 2015 the governing majority of the Law and Justice party began questioning the fundamental 
role of the Constitutional Court for maintaining the supreme position of the Constitution, 
underlining instead the role of the Chamber of Deputies and of the nation as the sovereign. This 
was illustrated by some politicians with the slogan ‘It is the nation that stands above the law, 
not the law above the nation’. Accordingly, the Parliament in November and December 2015 
adopted a series of laws, which aimed at disrupting and blocking the issuing of judgments by 
the Constitutional Court. The governing majority labelled those statutes ‘remedy laws’, while 
in fact they had the effect of slowing down or even paralysing the work of the Court. The 
‘remedy laws’, rather than being an incidental action of the legislature, aimed at extorting a 
constitutional change on the basis of a statute. Attempting to paralyse the work of the 
Constitutional Court, the ‘remedy laws’ moved the position of the Constitutional Court towards 
the legislative power. The governing majority, however, repealed those ‘remedy laws’ at the 
end of 2016, with the entry into force of three new statutes, which regulate the status of the 
Constitutional Court.47 These laws do not end the conflict around the Constitution Court, which 
position, as a consequence, has been marginalised. The situation of the Constitutional Court 
after 2015 is further discussed in Chapter 6.  
                                                 
46 Constitutional Court, judgment of 24.11.2010, K 32/09, OTK ZU 9A/2010 poz. 108; judgment of 19.12.2012, 
K 9/12, OTK ZU 11A/2012, poz. 136; judgment of 1.07.2014, SK 6/12, OTK ZU 7A/2014, poz. 68, 
respectively. 
47 Law of 13 December 2016 on Introductory provisions on the Law on Organisation and Procedure before the 
Constitutional Court, JL 2016 Pos 2074, JL 2018 Pos 849; Law of 30 November 2016 on the Status of the 
Judges of Constitutional Court, JL 2018 Pos 1142; Law of 30 November 2016 on the Organisation and 
Procedure before the Constitutional Court, JL 2016 Pos 2072. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Poland has its own constitutional heritage, with the Constitution of 3 May 1791 as its 
foundation. This heritage had practical meaning after World War II when Poland was 
incorporated into the group of Communist states, and in spite of this process people did not 
succumb to the Communist system. The society maintained its culture, tradition, and awareness 
of being connected to Rzeczpospolita. This was evident in the respect shown towards the 
cultural and legal achievements of the state referred to as Rzeczpospolita.  For over forty years 
– until 1989 – the Communist government in power did not succeed in eradicating this heritage. 
Following this, the ‘Solidarity’ movement and the efforts of civil society, as well as attachment 
to freedom played a crucial role in the shaping of a fully independent state post-1989. Without 
any doubt, thanks to the constitutional heritage, the transition from a Communist system to a 
parliamentary democracy took a relatively smooth and non-conflictual form, as compared to 
other states in the Communist bloc. As a consequence of these efforts and circumstances, 
Poland again became part of a free Europe, further expressed in its membership of the EU.  
Nowadays, it is hard to imagine Poland as a system of government other than a republic and a 
democratic state ruled by law. Even the weakening of the rule of law after 2015 – discussed in 
the next chapters – did not annihilate those fundamental principles of the state system. Polish 
constitutionalism experienced – and continues to experience – defeats and periods of 
regression. Ignoring the more distant times of the First Republic, such retrogression notably 
took place during the Second Republic, especially evident in the May Coup (1926), and in the 
circumstances of adoption of the April Constitution of 1935 in which some principles were 
undemocratic in character. In addition, the Communist period as a whole represented a negation 
of democratic constitutionalism.  So-called socialist constitutionalism was simply a doctrine of 
exercise of power by the Communist party, and should not be called constitutionalism at all.  
Finally, the attack of the governing majority on the judicial power after 2015 presents another 
period of retrogression that is best described as constitutional violence.  
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